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This paper presents a discussion about the interplay between Mental Model Theory 
and the generation of solutions to learning challenges in the primary classroom.  It 
explores how pupils negotiate the problem solving spaces that can arise in the two 
learning areas of Mathematics and Design and Technology although the cross-
curricula nature of learning in the primary classroom can conflate the two domains.   
 
Learning challenges engage thinking. Teachers will think about, and subsequently 
design, challenging scenarios that will stimulate their pupils to generate a range of 
possible solutions.  In turn, pupils will think about how they will meet the challenges.  
Mental Model Theory informs teachers’ knowledge about thinking: it explains how 
mental models arise from the idiosyncratic methods of developing the dialogue and 
relationships necessary to guide thinking.  Mental models are purposeful cognitive 
structures that have a process/product nature. They also have several functions that 
enable them to store data and enact strategies to generate outcomes. The theory 
explains how pupils engage in the thinking process to assimilate memory, new data 
and personalised strategies to find solutions to challenges.  When faced with a novel 
challenge, pupils retrieve, restructure and/or create, and store useable mental 
models in accordance with their perceived relevance to generate an acceptable 
outcome.   
 
This paper explores how a challenge, be it finding a solution to a mathematical 
conundrum or creating a response to a brief in Design and Technology, stimulates 
thinking processes. The discussion will consider how an understanding of the 
functions of mental models, through the use of the Mental Model Mode, can enhance 
constructive and inventive thinking in classrooms.  It proposes implications for 
pedagogical practice and some key considerations for teachers as reflective 
practitioner – and designer of learning challenges.   
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1. Understanding mental model theory 
 
The word “model” has lead to some vexation by researchers of cognitive theory 
because of peoples’ certainty that they understand what the word means when used 
in the designation mental model.  Everyone knows what a model is!  To remove any 
ambiguity about the word, “model” here serves two grammatical purposes: a noun 
where it is “a representation in three dimensions of … a proposed structure”, and as 
a verb “to form a thing in imitation of  . . .[that is, to] devise a model of a phenomenon 
or system” (Moore, 1987, p. 900).   Mental models, being “models” are bimodal 
(Edwards-Leis, 2010): as a product (Gentner & Stevens, 1983; Henderson & 
Tallman, 2006; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Newton, 1996) produced through cognition by 
individuals to create a representation or structure of a phenomenon or solution to a 
problem, and as a process (Carroll & Olson, 1988; Halford, 1993; Henderson & 
Tallman, 2006; Norman, 1983) where an action of retrieval, restructuring or creation 
occurs to form and reform these representations of the structure of a phenomenon or 
solution to a problem.  Consequently, the term “mental modelling” can be used to 
explain the process that individuals undertake when they create, or retrieve, mental 
models in order to devise more useful or refined mental models to solve problems.  
 
Confusion also exists in individuals’ beliefs that a “model”, in its purest form, may be 
a reproduction of the reality of a phenomenon in an environment.  Mental models are 
not just reproductions: they have a dynamic existence that is separate to the reality 
they model once they have been produced by the individual (Edwards-Leis, 2010). 
When a mental model is seen as useful it is stored, by the individual, in long-term 
memory where it may be related or connected to many other mental models and 
cognitive structures such as schemes (Piaget, 1970), schema (Anderson, 1977), 
propositions (Kyllonen & Shute, 1989) and scripts (Preece, Rogers, Sharp, Benyon, 
Holland & Carey 1994). However, the mental model now exists within its own reality 
and no longer relies on the replication of its source phenomenon (Barker, 1999).  
 
Novel problem situations are of interest to educators because they require learners 
to map knowledge and skills from known problems to new circumstances. Norman 
(1988) recognised that cognitive representations, such as schemata, could not 
explain what occurred when individuals encounter new or novel problems. Schema 
theory was seen to be inflexible due to schemata’s reliance on static propositional 
representations (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) and it did not account for the 
negotiation of irregular everyday encounters with the environment (Halford, 1993; 
Norman, 1988). Mental models use both propositional representations and schema 
to predict outcomes (Kyllonen & Shute, 1989) and in doing so, assist the functionality 
of short-term memory (Henderson & Tallman, 2006). Solving complex problems can 
be limited by working memory because it cannot hold all the components, such as 
which particular knowledge and which application of skills is necessary to solve the 
problem (Merrill & Gilbert, 2008).  
 
Halford (1993) argued that mental models reflect the structure of phenomenon in the 
environment whether it is a situation, task, concept or a problem with which an 
individual is faced. He hypothesised that if we can correctly, or incorrectly, 
understand the phenomena then we generate a respective correct, or incorrect, 
mental model. In other words, individuals can store mental models, that is, 
representations of phenomena which they correctly or incorrectly comprehend but for 
which they see some value in retaining.  Norman (1983) also highlighted this 
inaccurate and incorrect nature of mental models thereby suggesting an explanation 
for and individual’s retention of inaccurate information.  
 
  
Senge (1992) suggested that mental models had a multifarious nature and explained 
that we “cannot carry all the complex details of our world in our mind” (p. 36). He 
argued that “. . . we do not have mental models . . .  we are our mental models” as 
“they are inextricably woven into our personal life history and sense of who we are” 
(p. 37).   The essence of mental model theory and its interest to teachers is its 
capacity to explain how pupils interact with the world. Gentner and Stevens (1983) 
and van der Veer and Peurta-Melguizo (2002) described this interaction by linking 
mapping with a mental model’s function as a performance control mechanism. This 
mechanism enables us to predict, interpret, and communicate.  Craik (1943), the 
grandfather of mental model theory, described them as “representations in the mind 
of real or imaginary situations” (p. 12) and used the theory to explain how individuals 
explain, understand and solve anticipated events.  
 
In summary, mental models are cognitive structures that are based on new 
understandings, prior knowledge, existing ideas and past experiences that we use to 
interpret and explain events in our world (Moseley, Desjean-Perrotta & Utley, 2010). 
Williamson (1999) proposed that mental models are malleable and require some 
accommodation by the user or learner and that this may not always be easy to do, 
particularly if they are anchored by deeply held beliefs (Norman; 1983). Social and 
cultural relationships (Vosniado, 2002) that anchor a mental model may be very 
strong due to their being based on experiences, personal perceptions, and 
superstitions that may attach to certain emotions and/or experiences. Therefore the 
educational, social, and cultural relationships that exist to create mental models can, 
subsequently, make the mental model difficult to manipulate and alter if it is 
inaccurate.  However, human experience can also serve to make learning richer and, 
therefore, remembered.      
 
2. Methodology to discern mental model functions 
 
The study that was undertaken to investigate mental model functions was an 
empirical qualitative study, based in an Australian Primary school commencing in 
February 2005 and ending in October 2006.  The methodology was centred within 
information processing theory and linked with the introspection mediating process 
tracing paradigm.  This approach presented a significant conceptual framework (Kail 
& Bisanz, 1992; Lohman, 2000) to provide the model to “look inside the minds of 
learners to explore what happens when learning occurs” (McInerney & McInerney, 
2006, p. 96) and when students are carrying out tasks that involve problem solving 
(Henderson & Tallman, 2006).  This focus was essential because a determination of 
the in-action mental models used by students when they were solving problems 
would determine the functions of mental models that guide the process.  
 
The context for the study was robotics, which is an optional component of the 
Queensland Technology Syllabus (QSA, 2003). It provides a rich, multi-disciplinary 
environment in which to engage middle years students in designing, building, 
programming, and activating robots to complete set tasks.  This study illuminated the 
dynamic nature of mental models through a longitudinal approach that incorporated a 
variety of investigative instruments.  The study involved a binary focus both on the 
journey markers where data was collected through Likert Scale questionnaires, semi-
structured interviews, stimulated recall interviews, teach back episodes, journals and 
focus group interviews, and on the intriguing glimpses of the human experiences 
afforded along the way.  
 
The research examined how one teacher and her students’ mental models can inform 
teaching, learning, and authentic assessment practices.  There were twenty-four Year 
Six student participants and one teacher in the study.  Four students were 
  
anonymously chosen to participate in the more in-depth aspects of the study including 
stimulated recall sessions and semi-structured interviews.  All interview data were 
analysed using pattern coding (Miles & Huberman, 1994) in order to reduce data to 
workable units to enable both the determination of the mental models being studied 
and cross-participant analysis of common mental models.  So while mental models 
are internal structures (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Norman, 1983) they can be exteriorised 
(Barker, van Schaik, Hudson, Meng Tan, 1998) when triggered by interaction with a 
domain system (Carroll & Olson, 1988; Norman, 1983) such as robotics.  The 
resulting interactions, within the domain and with other participants, are physical 
(Jonassen, 1995) and those performances can be observed.   
 
3. How the functions of mental models can assist problem-solving 
 
Individuals construct idiosyncratic models (Norman, 1983) that may not be correct or 
useful to solve problems yet are retained because of their perception that they are 
functional. The uniqueness of a retained mental model retained arises from the way 
in which it reflects that individual’s interactions with the environment (Halford, 1993). 
Mental models also contain reflections of problems, events, and stories that may be 
imaginary (Byrne, 1992). Such fanciful ruminations arise from our constant 
interaction with the world and reflect our individualistic ability to develop the 
relationships and dialogue necessary to guide understanding. The functions of 
mental models that enable problem environments to be explored have been 
established through longitudinal study (Edwards-Leis, 2010) and include how mental 
models help us: 
o explain; 
o predict; 
o control action and thought; 
o diagnose; 
o communicate; and, 
o remember. 
 
The explanatory function enables understanding and selection of strategies because 
mental models “facilitate cognitive and physical interactions with the environment, 
with others, and with artefacts” (Henderson & Tallman, 2006, p. 25).  Simply put, in 
order to understand their world by comprehending what causes, influence, controls 
or prevents phenomena, humans construct models of it (Johnson-Laird, 1983).  But, 
not everything contained in a mental model is complete or accurate because, as 
Norman (1983) suggested, an individual’s mental models are shaped by personal 
attributes such as their background experiences, expertise in different domains and, 
often, their unscientific or superstitious beliefs. Also, we forget thing, or store them 
poorly in long-term memory, and mental models that are not used regularly become 
stagnant (Norman, 1983), often needing re-evaluation and modification if they are to 
remain useful and functional as a means of explaining phenomena.  
 
The predictive function enables problem solving in novel situations.  This act is not 
always a straightforward, logical or tidy process due to mental models containing 
mental images, analogies, assertions, propositions, relations, abstractions, 
superstitious and beliefs (Norman, 1983), as well as the associated conceptual, 
declarative, and procedural knowledge (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Newton, 1996; Redish, 
1994) for that situation. Mental models enable an individual to predict how a system 
will work or a problem will be solved (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Norman, 1983) and this 
function serves to differentiate mental models from other cognitive structures that do 
not account for novel situations that individuals encounter. If a mental model is 
accurate and complete then its predictive power should be greater and individuals 
can evaluate the plausibility of possible solutions.  The search for solutions to 
  
classroom challenges usually requires pupils to concurrently run and link various 
mental models (Norman; 1983; Payne, 1991) as they predict possible outcomes.  
 
The control function provides a platform from which to make decisions (Edwards-
Leis, 2010) and control behaviour (Henderson & Tallman, 2006; Newton, 1996) 
because individuals consider options when faced with choice. Mental models are 
“what people really have in their heads and what guides their use of things” (Norman, 
1983, p. 12).   Individuals can be conscious of running mental models although they 
can also be run unconsciously or automatically (Henderson & Tallman, 2006).  If a 
teacher is introducing a new idea that students are struggling to understand, they can 
retrieve and run mental models containing ideas, concepts, and/or strategies from 
past lessons that were successful. The teacher’s retrieval of successful experiences 
(Henderson & Tallman, 2006) indicates that mental models can be controlled to 
adapt the environmental phenomena and subsequently enable successful mapping 
of the new knowledge to existing mental models. 
 
The running of mental models enables even poor performances to be controlled 
because opposed to other cognitive structures such as schemata and scripts mental 
models have the capacity to deal with novel situations. The classroom experiences, 
documented by Henderson and Tallman’s (2006) research, were found to be either 
“liberating or stultifying” (p. 25) for the teacher and pupil. The difference is due to 
control: either the individual controls their mental modelling by retrieving and/or 
adapting them when they are diagnosed to be ineffectual to facilitate an effective 
solution or the individual is controlled by an unadaptable mental model and cannot 
make progress to a solution.  
 
The diagnostic function of mental models enables students to develop metacognitive 
awareness.  The term “perturbation” (Ritchie, Tobin and Hook, 1997) was used to 
explain the contradictions felt by learners when new knowledge was needed to link 
with prior knowledge to create a remodified mental model. The customised mental 
model would incorporate the new experiences and concepts in order to overcome the 
perturbed state. Some guidance may be necessary for the learner to move through 
perturbation into a state of equilibrium (Piaget, 1970) and this need for guidance 
reflects Vygotsky’s (1978) Zone of Proximal Development where it is important to 
take students “a little beyond” (p. 8) what they know or feel comfortable doing alone. 
The diagnostic function of mental models for pupils, therefore, relies on an 
understanding, or metacognitive awareness, that they may be working with a mental 
model that does not allow them to assimilate new concepts (Royer, Cisero & Carlo, 
1993) without this guided assistance.  
 
The communication function enables others to see and understand the 
externalisation of an individual’s mental models.  Mental models facilitate the 
communication processes of writing, reading, talking, and listening while thinking 
through problem-solving situations (Barker, van Schaik & Hudson, 1998). When 
students share or communicate their mental models to others in class it involves oral 
discourse (Craik, 1943) that requires discussion where the social negotiation of a 
transitory mental model that can jointly be held by the participants occurs. This 
sharing often necessitates a “collaborative critiquing of one’s own and others’ mental 
models” (Henderson & Tallman, 2006, p. 47).  Mental models are communicated 
through a language and other individual and cultural nuances such as facial 
expression, body posture, and vocal shades which all need to be ‘translated’ so that 
communication is successful. Written discourse can be complex as well and involves 
some form of writing where text or symbolic script is used to express what is known 
(Barker, van Schaik & Hudson, 1998).  
 
  
Mental models have a memory function.  They are transient and permanent because 
of their existence in both working memory and long-term memory (Gentner & 
Stevens, 1983; Henderson & Tallman, 2006).  However, it would seem that multiple 
mental models or parts of mental models could be run simultaneously (Norman, 
1983; Payne, 1991).  How an individual links the related parts of the mental models 
that are run depends on the network of related understandings (Henderson & 
Tallman, 2006) that they instantiate when the mental model is created and stored. 
Subsequently, how well an individual accesses or retrieves the required mental 
model, or part thereof, will depend on the efficacy of the storage process and the 
relevance of relationships perceived. Mental modelling can be influenced by many 
factors, including a student’s meta-ability and their ability to effectively use their 
working memory (Newton, 1996; Power & Wykes, 1996).   
 
4. The Mental Model Mode: a diagram of functionality  
 
While mental models are internal representations they are externalised through some 
action.  When pupils undertake problem solving in primary classrooms they are 
required to perform certain behaviours necessary to create or find a solution.  While 
the learning areas, within which the students are operating, might differ the mental 
modelling required to complete the task should show similarities.  The diagram 
(Figure 1) is the Mental Model Mode (MMM) that has been designed to explain the 
mental modelling that individuals undertake when they are addressing problem 
solving situations.   
Figure 1. Mental Model Mode: diagram of functionality (Edwards-Leis, 2012)  
 
The diagram accounts for the functions that mental models serve when an individual 
encounters a problem situation.  The following discussion uses the domains of 
Design and Technology and Mathematics to illustrate the functions of mental 
modelling.  It aims to establish the validity of the MMM to support teachers who are 
providing design or mathematical challenges for pupils in the primary.   
 
  
One of the distinctions between problem solving in Design and Technology and 
Mathematics is the perception of complexity within the problem to be solved and the 
creativity afforded the pupil in seeking a solution.  Design and Technology problems 
can be contextualised in most ‘everyday’ situations and while complex considerations 
need to be made the solutions available can be quite creative and unique.  The 
solutions can be new.  In mathematics, problems are most commonly used to 
introduce new mathematical knowledge (Jacobse & Harskamp, 2009) in order to 
contextualise the information and processes so that pupils can see how mathematics 
can be applied in ‘everyday’ situations.  The solutions usually require some strategic 
processes, such as constructing a table to organise data or the comparison of 
features, and are most commonly true.  This new versus true binary may not be 
mutually exclusive but offers and explanation for the delineation of the types of 
problems addressed in each of the learning areas.   
 
Mental modelling using the MMM in Mathematics can involve a variety of processes 
to get to the same solution.  Students encountering a problem to solve, such as how 
many pencil holders will be required for their Year Three classroom given x number 
of children, y number of tables, and z number of pencils, will need to retrieve the 
declarative knowledge about numerical values and operations from long-term 
memory necessary to explain what processes the problem involves.  They will then 
diagnose their ability to solve the problem.  This metacognitive process is essential 
because Johnson-Laird (2006) suggested that in most cases the inability to solve a 
problem is due to a lack of the knowledge required to do so.  Once the pupil has 
established that they do have the necessary knowledge they make predictions or test 
solutions.  If working with another pupil, they will share their transitory mental model 
predictions through oral, and perhaps written, communication (Figure 1).  The pupil 
will decide whether, or not, to alter their chosen solution and adopt the transitory 
mental model or retain, and subsequently store, their own.  They will need to be able 
to explain their solution and how it meets the criteria established in the problem and if 
it does – it is most likely true.  
 
Design and Technology offers pupils opportunities to create novel solutions to 
everyday problems.  Casakin (2011) discussed the access and retrieval process that 
students undertake when they design.  This process, not dissimilar to that used by 
pupils to solve problems in Mathematics, engages the pupil in retrieving the 
conceptual, declarative and procedural knowledge required to transfer to a novel 
problem.  The retrieval process depends on how a pupil explains the problem in light 
of their idiosyncratic ways of interacting with the world.  If pupils, in the Year Three 
classroom above who established how many pencil holders were required, were 
subsequently given a brief to design and make them, then it is possible that a variety 
of ideals, values and intentions (Lawson, 2004) would inform the subsequent 
solutions.  A teacher, who had exposed the students to a rich variety of materials, 
joining methods, and ethical design considerations, would anticipate disparate 
designs.  The MMM (Figure 1) helps explain the processes that students undertake 
when designing where a constant cycle of explaining, diagnosing and predicting 
would occur as the pupil applied the design process to meet the requirement of the 
brief.   
 
The MMM offers teachers a structure that explains the thinking processes that their 
pupils will use when meeting learning challenges.  If pupils are encountering 
difficulties in negotiating a problem, then some part of the MMM may not operating 
effectively to advance learning. Newell and Simon (1972) explored the concept of 
problem space, which defined all possible sequences of the mental operations that 
pupils needed to address when solving a problem.  An implication of this concept is 
that teachers need to consider this space and enact their own mental modelling, 
  
transacting the space to ensure that the all knowledge required for pupils to solve the 
problem is available.   
 
Johnson-Laird (2006) suggests that “imagination helps us to reason and reasoning 
helps us to imagine” (p.351) and this has significance for teachers who are designing 
the challenges that will engage pupils in primary school classrooms.  First, teachers 
should be creating the learning environments that expose pupils to rich problem 
states that enable them to mental model.  Mental modelling, in Design and 
Technology or Mathematics should enable pupils to build upon the repertoire of 
skills, memories, strategies, and knowledge required to address novel problems.  
Problem states, regardless of learning areas, need to provoke robust mental 
modelling that engage both the reasoning that supports explaining, diagnosing and 
predicting functions necessary to problem solve and the imagining that promotes our 
idiosyncratic interactions with the world that create the relationships necessary to 
store mental models in our long term memory.  
 
Providing significant opportunities to flex problem-solving strategies seems to be a 
key to success in learning to meet challenges.  In addition to have the opportunity to 
problem solve, Joacobse and Harskamp (2009) recommend that pupils also be given 
some initiative for the approaches they will use thereby encouraging cognitive 
flexibility and adaptability.  Mental model theory, through the MMM, enables the 
teacher to monitor the effectiveness of cognitive processes used by pupils when they 
are given such initiative.  It can also help to explain why pupils repeat the same 
errors. Johnson-Laird (2006) reported that the most plausible explanation for a 
pupil’s preference for an erroneous predicted solution lies in her inability to consider 
all alternative solutions and these processes may continue unless the pupil is helped 
to relinquish them.  The Mental Model Mode provides a way to explain constructive 
and inventive thinking in classrooms and enables a clearer understanding of what 
really happens when we meet challenges.  
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